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NATURE AND FINALITY 
IN ARISTOTLE 
James V. SCHALL 
RÉSUMÉ. — Dans la discussion de la nature et de la finalité chez Aristote, la 
philosophie politique notamment est impliquée directement. Ceci, en partie tout 
au moins, parce que la négation des notions aristotéliciennes de nature humaine 
induit à penser que l'art et l'agir humains n'ont pas de limites qui leur soient 
imposées «par nature ». Tel est l arrière-plan théorique de l'opinion selon laquelle 
l'univers lui-même est tout entier anthropocentrique. La politique ou l'action, dès 
lors, devient le substitut de la métaphysique ou de l'être. L'analyse d'Aristote des 
espèces de causes dans la nature, des espèces d'intelligence qui s'y révèlent et de 
leur rapport avec l'intelligence humaine, voilà qui fournit la base intellectuelle 
pour confiner la politique à ses limites, pour l'empêcher de devenir une science de 
ce qui est, sans autre présupposé que la volonté humaine. 
SUM MA RY. — Political philosophy in particular is directly related to the discussion 
of nature and finality in Aristotle. This is because, in part, at least, the denial of 
the Aristotelian notions of human nature, in particular, leads to the view that 
human art and human doing or action have no limits placed on them, "by 
nature". This is the theoretical background to the view that the universe itself it 
wholly "mancentered". Politics or action, then, becomes the substitute for 
metaphysics or being. Aristotle's analysis of the hinds of causes in nature, the 
kinds of intelligence revealed there and their subsequent relation to human 
intelligence, provide the intellectual basis for limiting politics to itself, for 
preventing it from becoming a science of what is, presupposed to nothing but the 
human will. 
r I X3 UNDERSTAND certain essential elements in political philosophy, it is first 
A necessary to grasp several basic ideas and positions in Aristotle, the rejection of 
which in later modern philosophy set the stage for a theory of politics presupposed to 
no limits other than what man imposed on himself. To see the importance of this, we 
must consider Aristotle's notions of nature and finality, within the context of his 
notion of cognition. Aristotle's theory of intellection was based on abstraction from 
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sensible things. The mind had an active part to play in knowledge '. The objects of 
knowledge, however, were themselves first made, first there, then known, so that the 
human mind, starting only with itself, its own powers, saw what was the intelligibility 
placed in things. 
It is at this point that Aristotle's discussion of nature in the Second Book of the 
Physics and the Fifth Book of the Metaphysics, together with his discussion of the 
sciences in the First Book of the de Partibus Animalium, takes on immense significance. 
Aristotle's idea of "nature" was based on his view that the Prime Mover has a 
relationship to the rest of reality. This relationship is often underplayed in discussions 
of Aristotle, since Aristotle did seem to make the First Mover simply an object of 
contemplation. However, if this view were fully true, all the formal expositions 
Aristotle has on "nature" would become meaningless, as would be also missed the full 
significance of his idea that the First Mover moves as objects of love and knowledge 
move. 
In Book XII of the Metaphysics, Aristotle discussed the "two ways the nature of 
the universe contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate 
and by itself, or as the order of parts"2. He answered this question by pointing out that 
both views contain some truth. The order of parts is intimately connected to the source 
of the universe, just as an army is related to its general. But the order of parts acquires 
its intelligibility from the leader. Or to state the same view somewhat negatively, 
without the "leader", there would be no order ; and hence, in Aristotle's view, no parts 
either. The arm cut off from the body is not an arm at all \ Aristotle's own answer to 
the question just posed is as follows : 
We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains 
the good and the highest good, whether something separate and by itself, or as the 
order of parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does ; for its good is found both 
in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter ; for he does not depend on the 
order but it depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow, but 
not all alike — both fishes and fowls and plants ; and the world is not such that 
one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are all connected. For all are 
ordered together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at 
liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for 
them, while the slaves and animals do little for the common good, and for the 
most part live at random ; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the 
nature of each4. 
1. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, III, 5, 430al4-20, Basic Works of Aristotle, Edited by Richard McKeon, New 
York, Random House, 1941, p. 592. (Further citations will be from this edition). See also John Herman 
RANDALL-, Aristotle, New York, Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 89 101 ; Henry VEATCH, 
Aristotle, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1974, pp. 76-79, 83-86; Charles N.R. MCCOY, 
The Structure of Political Thought, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963, Chapters I and II. 
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 10, 1075a 12 14, p. 885. 
3. //). 
4. //;., Metaphysics, XII, 10, 1075al2 23, pp. 855-86. 
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There is a most significant element in this passage. Aristotle had said that the highest 
good of the universe is contained in it in one sense as separate from it, and in another 
sense the good of the universe is contained in it as the order of parts which depend for 
their order on the leader. Next he dropped the analogy of the army and reverted to the 
"nature of the universe" to point out that "all things are ordered together somehow, 
but not alike". 
All of this must mean that just as the order of parts in an army is placed in the 
parts by its leader, so the order of parts in the universe is placed there by its orderer. 
And, as if to make sure that we understand him, Aristotle explicitly said that he was 
referring to living things, "both fishes and fowls and plants", which are ordered to one 
another. Consequently, the world "is not such that one thing has nothing to do with 
another, but they are connected". Why are they connected ? Because they are ordered 
"to one end", the extrinsic common good or goal. Aristotle used the example of a 
household to bring out this idea. In a household, freemen have a definite, responsible 
task to perform which is "already ordained for them". They contribute to the good of 
the household by this specific task which needs to be done. Servants and animals are 
also part of the household and are "freer" in a sense than the freemen because they 
cannot be trusted (Aristotle is not speaking pejoratively here, but stating a fact of 
experience) always to perform any really essential task in the household. Consequently, 
"they do little for the common good, and for the most part live at random". That is, 
their freedom in its very directionlessness is not intelligently related by their minds to 
the particular task of the household, because they do not see its end or purpose. 
This passage indicates the essential insight into Aristotle's notion of freedom. For 
freedom is connected with purpose for a common end. Whatever lacks this sense of 
purpose is "free", that is, it can wander about aimlessly, but it does not contribute 
directly, except through an orderer, to the order of the common good as understood. 
Therefore, this random liberty, with no consciously internalized purpose as seen, is 
reprehensible, or at least less good, needing direction from outside itself if it is not to be 
destructive to itself or others. As a result, it is not a positive kind of freedom. Slaves or 
servants and animals, however, in Aristotle's view — remembering that a "slave" for 
him was an objective fact, that is, primarily someone not causa sui, someone who, for 
his own good, had to be positively cared for by someone with intelligence, say those in 
modern mental institutions who are wards of the state5 — had a nature that allowed 
for their random kind of activity. "I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to 
be dissolved in their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share 
for the good of the whole6." Thus, this type of random activity of animals, even 
though it does not fit into the order of the universe (or order of the household) as men 
do, that is, as responsible activity passing consciously through an intellect, nevertheless, 
it does contribute to the order of parts, which is the good of the whole. For the whole 
to be the whole, the parts must be the parts they are. 
5. ID., Politics, 1,4, 1254aI5, p. 1131 ; I, 5, 1254b20-22, p. 1133. 
6. //;., Metaphysics, XII, 10, !075a24-25, p. 886. 
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On this foundation, Aristotle was able to set down his theory of nature. In Book V 
of the Metaphysics, he defined nature as follows : 
Nature in the primary and strict sense is the essence of things which have in 
themselves, as such, a source of movement ; for the matter is called the nature 
because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and growing are 
called nature because they are movements proceeding from this. And nature in 
this sense is the source of the movement of natural objects, being present in them 
somehow, either potentially or in complete reality7. 
Nature here is an attempt to recognize and define the fact that the "fishes and fowls 
and plants" which comprise part of the order of the universe and are interconnected 
have in themselves a natural source of motion such that they act always or for the most 
part in a definite manner, that is, as fishes and fowls and plants. 
In Book II of the Physics, Aristotle further pointed out that "'by nature' the 
animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies..."8. These things 
differ from the products of human art because products of art "... have no innate 
impulse to change". Nature, then, "is a source or cause of being moved and of being at 
rest in that to which it belongs primarily..."9. Each natural thing is a "substance ; for it 
is a subject, and nature always implies a subject in which it inheres" 1(). Nature can be 
used in several senses which always have to be clearly distinguished : the material 
substratum, the shape into which a thing grows, the efficient mover, and the "that for 
the sake of which" — the end n . 
Physics is distinguished from mathematics because the objects of mathematics 
have no natural movement or goal ,2. Aristotle here incidently also pointed out that 
the Platonic forms are really mathematizations of physical objects. Consequently, 
they ignore motion which is essential to the natural world. "The beholders of the 
theory of Forms do the same (as the mathematicians), though they are not aware of it ; 
for they separate the objects of physics, which are less separable than those of 
mathematics 13." Aristotle wished to indicate that natural living things display a 
finality in their process of growth. "But the nature is the end or 'that for the sake of 
which'. For if a thing undergoes a continuous change and there is a stage which is the 
last, this last stage is the end or 'that for the sake of which'14." 
Aristotle held, then, that in nature "somethings always come to pass in the same 
way, and others for the most part". Moreover, "... some events are for the sake of 
something, others not. Again, some of the former class (that is, those for the sake of 
7. Ibid., V, 4, 1015a13 19, p. 756. 
8. //)., Physics, II, 1, 192b9-10, p. 236. 
9. Ibid., II, 1, 192b 19, p. 236. 
10. Ibid., II, 1, 192b33-34, p. 236. 
11. Ibid., II, 3, 194b23-195a2, pp. 240-41. 
12. Ibid., II, 2, 193b33-34, p. 238. 
13. Ibid., 11,2, 193b35 37, p. 239. 
14. Ibid., l\,2, 194a28-30, p. 239. 
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something) are in accordance with deliberate intention, others not, but both are in the 
class of things which are for the sake of something"15. In this passage, Aristotle said 
that everything of nature happens for some end or purpose, even those things which 
are the acts of "deliberative reason", that is, acts of men. Thus he said, "events that are 
for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or 
nature" ,6. Even chance events, as Aristotle went on to show, involve reason in some 
sense. He concluded, "Intelligent reflection, then, and chance are in the same sphere, 
for purpose implies intelligent reflection"17. 
So far, then, the argument has been brought to this point : Aristotle held that 
things that happen regularly or for the most part reveal purpose. But he recognized 
also that the source of this purpose need not be the "rational deliberation" of the being 
acting. By this he meant to imply that the regular activity of animals reveals purpose, 
but not rational deliberation on their part. But it does reveal rational deliberation on 
somebody's part, "for purpose implies intelligent deliberation". As a result, Aristotle 
could not admit that everything happens by chance, because chance implies purpose 
and not mere chaos. "Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to intelligence 
and nature. Hence, however true it may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity, it 
will still be true that intelligence and nature will be prior causes of this all and of many 
things in it besides 18." Aristotle, therefore, wanted to show why "nature belongs to the 
class of causes which act for the sake of something". In other words, he wanted to show 
that nature reveals a directing intelligence since it displays order and, as was evident 
from the discussion of the Metaphysics, order implies a relationship to an extrinsic 
cause l9. 
Aristotle next faced an argument that is almost modern. "Why should not nature 
work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, 
not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity20?" Why should not teeth, for 
example, come up of necessity? Why is it necessary to suppose that their peculiar 
regular arrangement implies order? Why could not the organization or order be 
spontaneous, the survival of the fittest ? Aristotle thought that "it is impossible that 
this should be the true view"21. Why? "For teeth and all other natural things either 
invariably or normally come about in a given way ; but of not one of the results of 
chance or spontaneity is this true22." There is purpose revealed here. Consequently, 
15. Ibid., 11,5, 196bl0-ll,p. 244. 
16. Ibid., 11,5, 196b 17 20, p. 244. 
17. Ibid., 11,5, 197a7, p. 245. 
18. Ibid., 11,6, 198a9-12, p. 247. 
19. //;., Metaphysics, XII, 10, 1075al2-23, pp. 885-86. 
20. ID., Physics, II, 8, 198bl7 19, p. 249. 
21. Ibid., 11,8, 198b20-35, p. 249. 
22. Ibid., II, 1, 198b35-37, p. 249. 
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action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature. Further, 
where a series has a completion (that is, "it is not any chance thing that comes 
from a given seed but an olive from one kind and a man from another..."23), all 
preceding steps are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so in 
nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if nothing interferes. Now 
intelligent action is for the sake of an end ; therefore the nature of things also is 
so24. 
Nature is for an end in the same way as artifacts are for an end. Indeed, art imitates 
nature in this respect that it attempts to understand the order of nature so that it can 
reproduce by art its own creations, just as nature produces its own objects. 
We can see how nature acts more clearly if we look to "animals rather than men : 
they make things neither by art nor after inquiring or deliberation"25. Even plants as 
well as "spiders, ants, or the like" show that something is produced for an end — 
"leaves, e.g. grow to provide shade for the fruit"26. Nature, therefore, produces all 
things for an end. "And since 'nature' means two things : the matter and the form, of 
which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must 
be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which''27." Mistakes in nature, 
monstrosities, simply argue to some attempt at purpose which was not attained just as 
in art mistakes are possible. Natural things are those which "by a continuous 
movement originated from an internal principle arriving at some completion: the 
same completion is not reached by every principle ; nor any chance completion, but 
always the tendency in each is toward the same end, if there is no impediment"28. 
Therefore, there is order in the processes of natural things. "But when an event takes 
place always or for the most part, it is not incidental or by chance. In natural products 
the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment29." 
Yet, this stress on order and finality in nature is of little value until there is a grasp 
of what kind of necessity this finality of nature implies Aristotle held that material 
praesupposita to the existence of a form, that is, stones and walls for a house, while 
necessary, are not to be considered the reasons why the effect, the house, is produced. 
Whereas, though the wall does not come to be without these, it is not due to these 
except as its material cause : it comes to be for the sake of sheltering and guarding 
certain things. Similarly, in all other things which involve production for an end 
(men, animals, plants, etc.), the product cannot come to be without things which 
have a necessary nature, but is not due to these (except as its material) ; it comes to 
be for an end 3(). 
23. Ibid., II, 4, 196a31-33, p. 244. 
24. Ibid., II, 8, 199a6-12, p. 249-50. 
25. Ibid., 11,8, 199a21-22, p. 250. 
26. Ibid., II, 8, 199a23~26, p. 250. 
27. Ibid., 11,8, I99a30-33, p. 250. 
28. Ibid., 11,8, 199bl6 19, p. 251. 
29. Ibid., 11,8, 199b23 25, p. 251. 
30. Ibid., II, 9, 200a5 10, p. 251. 
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The necessity in nature, then, is one of supposition of the end. Someone, the extrinsic 
common good, is the cause "for the sake of which" all things come to be what they are. 
But they are what they are solely because this cause wanted them to be what they are. 
The internal cause, the form, causing them to be a this rather than a that, itself requires 
this explanation of why it is what it is in fact. The necessity of nature, therefore, does 
not exist by simple necessity. 
Aristotle, in an important analogy, compared the "necessity in mathematics" to 
"necessity in things which come to be through the operation of nature"31. This seems 
strange at first sight, since we should have expected the opposite, that is, that the 
necessity of things which "come to be by the operation of nature", which is one of 
hypothesis, would be different from the necessity of mathematics, which implies 
simple necessity. However, the fact that Aristotle compared the ends of all nature, 
including human, to the necessity of mathematical principles rather than to the 
hypothetical necessity of the ends of art is one of the most important ideas in Aristotle 
and of great significance to later philosophy. Like mathematics, the starting point is 
compared to the ends of natures which act for a purpose. Therefore, if the end is not 
present, neither will be the material principles which go to make it up of necessity be 
present. 
If there is to be a house, such-and-such things must be made or be there already or 
exist, or generally the matter relative to the end, bricks and stones, if it is to be a 
house. But the end is not due to these except as the matter, nor will it come to be 
because of them32. 
Therefore, bricks and stones are necessary for the house to be, but the house, the end, 
is only present because someone chose it and knows what a house is. 
In the Ethics, Aristotle brought out more clearly the implications of this position. 
For as far as men are concerned, the types of forms that do exist in nature — men, 
animals, plants — have final causes that are compared to mathematical axioms, as 
data which cannot be otherwise. But as far as the Extrinsic First Mover is concerned, 
they are not necessary, but willed, they could be otherwise, just as an artist can choose 
any end and form in which to embody it. 
For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principles, and in 
actions the final cause is the first principle, as the hypotheses are in mathematics ; 
neither in that case is it argument that teaches the first principles, nor is it so 
here...33. 
Therefore, men are not free in morals and politics to change the natural ends of their 
nature and whatever is needed to support these ends — family, marriage, state, 
tendency to happiness. These ends are part of human nature ex suppositione finis, the 
end of the Prime Mover, not the end of the human agent. Freedom consists in 
discovering this end or form and living according to it as what is. 
31. Ibid., 11,9, 200al5-16, p. 252. 
32. Ibid, II, 9, 200a24-28, p. 252. 
33. ID., Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 8, 1151al5-18, p. 1050. 
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The natural distinction in things, then, the differences in capacity and grade of 
being are to be considered not as exclusively the results of fault or injustice. They are 
results of the activity of the First Mover in guiding all things to his (and their) own end, 
in seeing that being is better when it manifests itself in the abundance of a great variety 
of possible beings having come into existence rather than in a parsimonious few. 
When, therefore, man rebels against the rule of reason over the passions, or against the 
family, or society, he rebels, in Aristotle's view, against the order of nature, which is in 
nature as a result of the decision of the First Mover34. It is for this reason that, later on, 
Marx will maintain that Aristotle "alienated" man from himself by imposing a God as 
the reason for the distinction in things. 
One further treatise in Aristotle should be discussed in this context, the extremely 
important initial chapters of the de Partibus Animalium, in which he treated of nature 
and its relation to art and experimental science. Again Aristotle pointed out that the 
necessity in nature is a hypothetical necessity, not an absolute one. 
For there is absolute necessity, manifested in eternal phenomena ; and there is 
hypothetical necessity, manifested in everything that is generated by nature as in 
everything that is produced by art, be it a house or what it may. For if a house or 
other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that such and such material 
shall exist ; and it is necessary that first this and then that shall be produced, and 
first this and then that set in motion, and so on in continuous succession until the 
end and final result is reached, for the sake of which each prior thing is produced 
and exists. As with these productions of art, so also is it with the productions of 
nature35. 
In the theoretical sciences, the starting point is that "which is"; in the productive 
sciences it is "that which is to be". Thus, if a man or health is yet to be, this necessitates 
certain other antecedents. The mere existence of these antecedents does not, however, 
necessitate the man or health ; rather the reverse is true, the end, that is, the man or the 
health, necessitates the antecedents36. 
Aristotle's philosophy here admits of a "material evolution" in the sense that 
material antecedents necessary for the existence and coming to be of an existent being 
may be and, in fact, are usually prior to the ultimate form which is to be substantially. 
But this does not imply that material antecedents can be taken by themselves ; they are 
always for the sake of something else. "For the process of evolution is for the sake of 
the thing finally evolved, and not for the sake of the process37." Finality is always 
present in Aristotle. This very fact is why he propounds his famous doctrine that the 
logical order and the real order develop in reverse to one another. 
34. ID., Metaphysics, I, 2, 982b27-30, p. 692. 
35. ID., Parts of Animals, I, 1, 639b24-33, pp. 644-45. 
36. "The mode of necessity, however, and the mode of ratiocination are different in natural science from 
what they are in the theoretical sciences ; of which we have spoken elsewhere. For in the latter the 
starting point is that which is ; in the former that which is to be. For it is that which is yet to be - - health, 
let us say, or a man — that, owing to its being of such and such characters, necessitates the pre-existence 
or previous production of this and that antecedent ; and not this or that antecedent which, because it 
exists or has been generated, makes it necessary that health or a man is in, or shall come into, existence." 
Ibid., I, 1, 639b33-640a7, p. 645. 
37. Ibid., I, 1,640a 18, p. 645. 
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Now the order of actual development and the order of logical existence are always 
in inverse of each other. For that which is posterior in the order of development is 
antecedent in the order of nature, and that is genetically last which in nature is 
first38. 
But lest the full implications of this whole doctrine be missed, it should be pointed out 
that for Aristotle, the intelligible order in the universe which guides, as it were, the 
material evolution is not simply "logical", but is real in the First Act. "Actual 
knowledge is identical with its object ; potential knowledge in the individual is in time 
prior to actual knowledge but in the universe it has no priority even in time ; for all 
things that come into being arise from what actually is39." 
It is due to this consciousness of a type of artistic order that, as we have suggested, 
Aristotle compares artistic works to the works of nature. "Art indeed consists in the 
conception of the result to be produced before its realization in matter 40. " Nature, too, 
then is preconceived, but not by man. For there to be a man, there need to be certain 
antecedents in nature, and for man to exist in a more suitable way, other antecedents 
are required. 
The fittest mode, then, of treatment is to say a man has such and such parts, 
because the conception of man includes their presence, and because they are 
necessary conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot quite say this, which would 
be best of all, then the next thing to it, namely, that it is either quite impossible for 
him to exist without them, or, at any rate, that it is better for him that they should 
be there and their existence involves the existence of other antecedents. This we 
should say, because man is an animal with such and such characters, therefore is 
the process of his development necessarily such as it is; and therefore is it 
accomplished in such and such an order, this part being formed first, that next, 
and so on in succession ; and after a like fashion should we explain the evolution 
of all other works of nature41. 
For Aristotle, then, nature produces gradations of conditions and existents ranging 
from the absolutely necessary to the most fitting and pleasant. All is not one and 
monolithic. 
Aristotle pointed out that no "abstraction can form a subject of natural science, 
seeing that everything that nature makes is means to an end"42. This fact of an actual 
striving is the one factor that is always present in nature. The "holders of the theory of 
Forms", though they are not aware of it, really abstract from motion just like the 
mathematician, but this abstraction from motion is what prevents them from seeing 
the real world where motion is present43. Aristotle then sat down the key passage 
38. Ibid., II, l,646a25-27, p. 659. 
39. //)., De Anima, III, 7, 43IaI-4, p. 593. 
40. //)., Parts of Animals, I, 1, 640a32, p. 646. 
41. Ibid., I, I,640a34-b4, p. 646. 
42. Ibid., I, 1,64lb 10-12, p. 649. 
43. ID., Physics, II, 2, 193b35 194a5, p. 239. 
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which related, in one brief statement, all we have been stressing about the relation of 
nature, the Extrinsic Mover, hypothetical necessity, and art : 
For just as human creations are products of art, so living objects are manifestly 
the products of an analogous cause or principle, not external but internal, derived 
like the hot and the cold from the environing universe. And that the heaven, if it 
had an origin, was evolved and is maintained by such a cause...44. 
Why? Because "order and definiteness are much more plainly manifested in the 
celestial bodies than in our own frame..."45. These remarks of Aristotle, taken in the 
total line of argument thus far presented, are an extremely important corrective for 
anyone who is overly ready to eliminate the possibility of creation from Aristotle's 
thought in the sense of it being necessarily contradictory to it. Perhaps the reason 
cannot "prove"creation, perhaps Aristotle needed an eternal succession of existents to 
ground his forms, but in this passage he did suggest the possibility of the origin of the 
universe from a cause which stands to the universe as the human artist to the work of 
art, that is, as creator of the ends and means of the created product, which then 
continues to exist in its own right with its own capacities. In this sense, too, Aristotle's 
analogy of the army and its leader as applied to the universe takes on its most 
profound significance. 
This line of argument becomes more pertinent in the light of the following 
passage : "It is impossible that any abstraction can form a subject of a natural science, 
seeing that everything that nature makes is means to an end46." Aristotle said that 
some philosophers maintained that there is order in nature, to be sure, but that the 
universe as such was a product of "chance and spontaneity". This heaven, he 
exclaimed, "in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible !"47. 
Why cannot this theory of chance creation be held? Because nature is not an 
abstraction. It is a moving, vital process that actually is occurring in a definite manner. 
"A given germ does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any 
chance one ; but each germ springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite 
progeny48." These facts lead to the philosophical conclusion that 
whenever there is plainly some final end, to which a motion tends should nothing 
stand in the way, we always say that such final end is the aim or purpose of the 
motion ; and from this it is evident that there must be something or other really 
existing, corresponding to what we call by the name of Nature49. 
Aristotle was very empirical here. He did discover a definite order in nature as revealed 
by the definite growth and decay of living things. This order is not an imagined one, 
but it really does happen. Therefore, he insisted nature is not an abstraction, nor is its 
order. 
44. ID., Parts of Animals, I, 1, 641 b 12-17, p. 649. 
45. Ibid., I, 1,641b 19, p. 649. 
46. Ibid., I, 1,641M0, p. 649. 
47. Ibid., I, l,641b24, p. 649. 
48. Ibid., I, l,641b28-29, p. 649. 
49. Ibid., I, l,641b24-28, p. 649. 
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From this, Aristotle proceded to a further discussion of the status of natural 
causes. He concluded that they have a "hypothetical necessity", not an absolute one. If 
nature is to be, then certain things are required. But there is no need for nature to be. 
Someone had to first desire an end. Aristotle, therefore, insisted that hypothetical 
necessity, absolute necessity, and final end be distinguished. Final end, to be attained, 
may indeed require the absolute necessity of certain other factors. For if there is to be a 
man, he must have flesh and bones. But the final end itself can be hypothetical. Thus 
the elements required for its achievement will in that event also be hypothetical. 
Absolute necessity, taken strictly, refers to inherent interconnections — that is, man 
has to be rational, plants have to be non-sentient. 
By necessity we shall sometimes mean hypothetical necessity, the necessity, that 
is, that the requisite antecedents shall be there, if the final end is to be reached ; 
and sometimes absolute necessity, such necessity as that which connects substances 
and their inherent properties and characters50. 
Thus, it should be noted that a substance, a man or a dog, may be hypothetical, that is, 
need not be, but what-a-man-is has certain necessary properties even though such a 
thing as a man or dog never was. 
The ends of nature with respect to man are fixed, made, not to be made. Man is 
not free to change them and still be man. Consequently, man's position with respect to 
nature is not the relationship of maker. If there is intelligibility in nature, it is already 
there, man finds it ; he does not make it. But the intelligent creature's discovery of his 
own being ought to be exhilarating to him, the discovery that he is, after all, well made, 
better than he could hope to do himself. The philosophic or theoretical sciences for 
Aristotle are based on this viewpoint. But this does not mean that Aristotle intended to 
say that man could not gain some knowledge of nature after the manner of a maker. 
Quite the contrary, experimental science does not, as theoretic science, come to 
necessary conclusions about the substance of things. Indeed, most of what is known 
arises from experimental analyses which do not produce necessary conclusions, but 
possible ones. 
This is why we can propose a different structure for man, even though we are 
bound — and bound in the sense in which we are "bound" to the primary movement of 
the First Mover51 — by his actual theoretic structure given by nature which man did 
not make. There is, for instance, no apparent reason for the practically invariable 
connection in nature between man and two-footedness or five-fingeredness. Yet man 
as he comes from nature does possess these characteristics for the most part. Why? 
Aristotle felt that an examination of all the varieties of animals, no matter how 
revolting or strange they might seem, would shed some light on such problems because 
it would reveal "to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed them, give 
immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to 
philosophy"52. 
50. Ibid., I, l,642a33-34, p. 651. 
51. ID., Metaphysics, XII, 7, 1072b4. 
52. ID., Parts of Animals, I, 5, 645a9-l 1, p. 657. 
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Aristotle thus thought that artistic representations of nature by man were to be 
appreciated, but even more so the "original realities themselves" should be "more 
interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the reasons that determined their 
formation"53. The experimental scientist can, therefore, by his careful analysis of what 
actually happens in nature approach the mentality of nature's originator. He will 
discover "absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be 
found in nature's works in the highest degree..."54. Moreover, he will also find that the 
"principle object of natural philosophy is not the material elements but their composition, 
and the totality of forms, independently of which they have no existence"55. The 
experimental scientist, as later philosophy will clearly reveal, tends to look upon 
reality after the manner of a maker, rather than after the manner of a philoso pher who 
looks at it as having been formed, to seek the causes of its being what and such as it is. 
From this attitude, it is but a short step for the modern philosopher, following modern 
experimental science, by denying to nature an intelligibility placed there by nature's 
cause, to look on natural things as completely malleable or formable, as something 
that he makes and constructs by his own intellect, presupposed to no fixed nature or 
form, either in natural or especially rational creatures. 
The significance of the foregoing discussion of Aristotle's view of nature lies in 
the fact that it is one of the recurring issues that lie at the foundations of modern 
political theory, which underlies most contemporary problems in both theology and 
metaphysics56. The medievals, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, were still able 
to understand and interpret Aristotle because, as Christians, they could accept these 
foundations. However, beginning with Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism, but 
especially with the revival of these philosophies in the Seventeenth Century, practically 
all modern political theory from Machiavelli, Descartes, Hobbes, Grotius, Rousseau, 
Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Marx became an attempt to reverse the implications of 
Aristotle's view57. 
Modern political theory, in Marx's phrase, is a gradual, progressive attempt to 
"hominize" nature, that is, to remove the need for a First Cause or Divinity from 
nature and substitute man himself as the prime cause of the distinction of things. Marx 
was to accuse Aristotle of inaugurating the primary alienation of man from himself 
because Aristotle recognized that the natural ends of nature were caused to be what 
they were by the First Mover, not by man himself. For Marx, this was an alienation, 
53. Ibid., I, 5, 645al4-15, p. 656. 
54. Ibid., I, 5, 645a23 25, p. 657. 
55. Ibid., I, 5, 645a25-37, p. 657. 
56. See James V. SCH ALL, "Political Theory and Political Theology", Laval Théologique et Philosophique 
31 (1975), pp. 25-48; "Political Philosophy and Christianity", Center Journal, Fall 1983, pp. 47-66; 
"Reason, Revelation, and Politics: Catholic Reflections on Strauss", Gregorianum 2 (pp. 349-65) and 
3 (pp. 469-97) ; "The Supernatural Destiny of Man", Modern Age, Fall 1982, pp.411-15 ; "Metaphysics, 
Theology, and Political Theory", Political Science Reviewer, Fall 1981, pp. 1-25. 
57. See James V. SCH ALL, "Post-Aristotelian Philosophy and Political Theory", Cithara, November 1963, 
pp. 56-79 ; "The Reality of Society in St. Thomas", Divus Thomas 1 ( 1980), pp. 13-23 ; Christianity and 
Politics, Boston, St. Paul Editions, 1981 ; and "St. Thomas Aquinas Review", Teaching Political 
Science, Summer 1983, pp. 195-98. See also, MCCOY, ibid., Charter III. 
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something imposed on man, not chosen by him and therefore intolerable. Man had to 
show his independence by overturning these natural ends — family, state, virtue — so 
he could be for and by himself alone. But Aristotle could accept the limitations man 
discovered in his nature. Aristotle, in other words, could let man be man and therefore 
let politics be politics and not some spurious metaphysics which derived no norms or 
values in man except what man, usually the most powerful man, the collective polis 
itself, put there. The struggle for politics remains at bottom a struggle about 
metaphysics and its openness to intelligibility, from whatever the source. 
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